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ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC: SOME THOUGHTS ON SUCCESS OR
FAILURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
RobertA. Hillman*
I am pleased to contribute to this symposium in honor of Bob Summers and Jim
White, whose treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code) has
educated countless lawyers and law students for almost fifty years on the intricacies
of commercial law.' A good portion of the treatise focuses on Article 2, Sales, which
is fitting because Article 2 continues in the twenty-first century to generate a large
amount of the litigation that the treatise so ably covers. The volume of litigation on
Article 2, along with the rise of e-commerce, raises the question of whether Article
2 can succeed in the twenty-first century. That is the subject of this essay.
There are, of course, many ways to measure success or failure of legislation.
One strategy, applied here, is to evaluate Article 2 against the UCC's ambitious
"purposes and policies" of simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing commercial law,
supporting commercial practices, and promoting uniformity of the law among the
states.2 In doing so, I will adapt three questions, from criteria that I previously
identified for determining when particular sections of Article 2 impede these goals
and are ripe for revision3 :
1. Does Article 2 continue to generate litigation?
2. Does Article 2 keep up with twenty-first century technology?
3. Does Article 2 impede twenty-first century commercial
practices?4
* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to David Azimov for excellent
research assistance.
1. I joined the four-volume practitioner's sixth edition of the treatise, see JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S.
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Practitioner 6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter UCC
TREATISE]. There is also a one volume student edition, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (Student 6th ed. 2010).
2. U.C.C § 1-103(a)(1)-(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
3. See Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 ofthe UC.C.: The NOM Clause Model, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1509 (1994). In 1994 the wheels were in motion to revise Article 2. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) appointed a study group charged with recommending whether
to revise Article 2. NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALI) then appointed a drafting committee to revise
the Article. Several years later, NCCUSL withdrew revised Article 2, and no state has enacted it. For one perspective
on why revised Article 2 failed, written by the chair of the drafting committee, see Richard E. Speidel, Revising
UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 607-09 (2001).
4. Hillman, supra note 3, at 1514-18. I identified other criteria for revision as well, including whether an
Article 2 section conflicts with other law such as Magnuson-Moss and the Convention on the International Sales of
Goods (CISG), and whether states have enacted non-uniform amendments to a section.
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These questions are obviously related, as we shall see. Based on the analysis of
these issues, I will identify some problematic Article 2 sections, and some that need
no tinkering. In the conclusion, I briefly consider next steps if the climate for revision
of Article 2 is renewed.
I. DOES ARTICLE 2 CONTINUE TO GENERATE LITIGATION?
This question is obviously pertinent to the issue of whether Article 2 simplifies
and clarifies sales law. If a section has spurred lots of litigation because of
"inconsistent, vague, or ambiguous language," it has not succeeded to simplify and
clarify the law nor to promote uniformity.5 Here, I focus on provisions that generated
litigation previously, where there is little reason to believe things will improve in the
twenty-first century.
Previously, I singled out Section 2-207 as an obvious example of a section in
need of revision and therefore a failure as written. I wrote:
Section 2-207, which deals with the "battle of the forms," comes to
mind as a likely candidate for revision . . . . The section contains
famously unclear language and has produced mountains of
litigation, which, unfortunately, has not led to a breakthrough in
analysis. This is not surprising. The original drafters took on a
colossal challenge when they sought to supply the terms of a
contract for parties whose inconsistent forms cross in the mail.6
I have little reason to reassess my thinking about Section 2-207, at least if
businesses continue to utilize paper purchase orders and acknowledgment forms.' In
fact, Section 2-207 cases still arise with some frequency. Of course, reasons that a
section generates litigation could exist independent of any lack of artfulness of the
language of the section. For example, judging from the cases, merchants still heavily
rely on their purchase order and confirmation practices that generate "battle of the
forms" issues when the forms do not match. This practice simply may not be
susceptible to effective regulation when the parties begin to perform the contract
without having agreed on material terms.9 In addition, the drafters of Article 2
purposefully applied broad standards, such as materiality in Section 2-207(2)(b), that
5. Hillman, supra note 3, at 1514-16.
6. Hillman, supra note 3, at 1514. "Unfortunately, [2-207] is like an amphibious tank that was originally
designed to fight in the swamps but was sent to fight in the desert." 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 79. For a
recent case characterizing the section, see Frix v. Integrity Medical Systems, Inc., 2017 WL 4171987, at *8 (W.D.
Tenn. July 21, 2017) ("No provision of the UCC, at least in Article 2, can match the battle of the forms provision
for opportunities to ensnare parties and even the occasional court.").
7. But see infra note 44 and accompanying text (technology may decrease the number of 2-207 cases in the
future).
8. In the last five years or so, Jim White and I have prepared pocket parts for the UCC Treatise. We have
included close to 65 cases that apply Section 2-207. Of course, this does not take into account the likely volume of
disputes that arise, because of the section's opaqueness, that do not reach the stage of a reported case.
9. 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 77. ("It is a sad fact that many sales contracts are not fully bargained,
not carefully drafted, and not understandingly signed or otherwise acknowledged by both parties.").
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might generate litigation, in part to accommodate the UCC goal in Section 1-
103(a)(2) of allowing for the "continued expansion of commercial practices."'o
Clearly, however, Section 2-207's language creates interpretation issues that
modem commercial practices have not yet resolved and that promote litigation. A
ton of secondary literature, including the UCC Treatise, covers its mishaps, and this
is not the place to rehash the myriad problems of draftsmanship in detail." A few
examples should suffice. Why does subsection 1 introduce the issue of "additional"
or "different" terms, when subsection 2, which explains whether terms are part of
the contract or only "proposals," refers only to "additional" terms? What happens to
"different" terms? For that matter, if a purchase order is silent on an issue (for
example, it fails to disclaim the implied warranties of Sections 2-314 and 2-3 15), but
the confirmation expressly fills the gap (for example, it disclaims all implied
warranties), is the term in the confirmation an additional or a different term? After
all, the Article 2 default is to set forth implied warranties, so a disclaimer of them in
a confirmation arguably is "different." Further, when is an additional term a
"material" alteration?1 2 And why does Section 2-207 favor the first form over the
second by providing that material terms in the second form drop out?13 Finally, when
should the court rely on subsection 3, which applies when "the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract"? 14
The drafting committee for revised Article 2, tried its hands at various revisions
to Section 2-207 and the final effort would have improved matters.15 The revised
section read:
Subject to Section 2-202, if (i) conduct by both parties recognizes
the existence of a contract although their records do not otherwise
establish a contract, (ii) a contract is formed by an offer and
acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any manner is confirmed in
a record that contains terms additional to or different from those in
the contract being confirmed, the terms of the contract, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties
agree; and
10. I made this point regarding another such standard: "The drafters intentionally left unconscionability
open-ended, inviting parties to litigate and courts to engage in case-by-case contextual analysis of whether a contract
or term should be struck down on fairness grounds. Litigation, therefore, does not [always] signal a problem of
clarity or consistency. Instead, it demonstrates a choice made by the drafters in favor of a standard over a rule." See
Hillman, supra note 3, at 1514-15.
11. See, e.g., 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 77-134.
12. See U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt.4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
13. See id. at § 2-207(2)(b).
14. All of these issues are treated in 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 77-134.
15. See 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 116-34. Revised Article 2, including the 2-207 revision, never
became law. See supra note 3.
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(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of
this Act.16
This approach would have been much less complicated. Among other things, it
would have resolved the additional-different, materiality, and 2-207(3) mysteries by
eliminating the offending language. Perhaps most important, sending the first form
would not have created an advantage.17
Section 2-209 is another section that appears to raise issues relatively unchanged
in today's sales law environment and that keeps the cases coming. 8 Issues
unresolved include what constitutes a "good faith" modification under subsection
1.19 Another issue is the extent to which subsection 4's reference to waiver subsumes
subsection 3's greater-than-$500 writing requirement because "an attempt at
modification or rescission . .. can operate as a waiver." 20
The same "can operate as a waiver" language especially causes headaches in the
treatment of no oral modification (NOM) clauses. Section 2-209(2) authorizes the
parties to write their own private Statute of Frauds for modification agreements and
rescissions. 2 1 But subsection 4 clouds the analysis by allowing oral waivers when the
parties' "attempt at modification or rescission" "operate[s] as a waiver." 2 2 Questions
raised by this language include precisely when does an oral modification in the face
of a NOM clause waive the NOM clause-if always, there is nothing left of
subsection 2. In addition, what exactly is an "attempt at modification"? Does it
simply require an oral agreement to modify? Does it require reliance? Ultimately,
Section 2-209 raises freedom of contract issues. However, does freedom mean that
parties should have the power to make NOM clauses inviolate or does freedom mean
that parties should be able to change their minds about requiring only written
modifications? 23
The UCC issues singled out here are not new. As noted, judging from the
reported cases, twenty-first century developments have not yet resolved or
exacerbated these problems. But changes in technology may signal their
obsolescence. 24 That is the subject of the next section of this essay.
16. Amended section 2-207 is set forth in 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 117-18.
17. See 1 UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 117-19.
18. In the last five years, close to thirty pocket part cases have been added to the UCC Treatise that apply
U.C.C. § 2-209.
19. See Robert A. Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract Modification
under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REv. 335, 353-56 (1981).
20. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 364-70.
21. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
22. Id. at § 2-209(4).
23. On all of this, see Hillman, supra note 19, at 364-70. Another mystery of Article 2 is the meaning of
"basis of the bargain" in section 2-3 13 (Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample). See 1
UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 869-82.
24. See infra note 42, and accompanying text.
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II. DOES ARTICLE 2 KEEP UP WITH TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TECHNOLOGY?
The second criterion concerns whether Article 2 has kept up with changes in
technology. If not, Article 2 has failed another goal of the Code set forth in Section
1-103(a)(2), to support "the continued expansion of commercial practices." As the
conclusion to Part I intimates, we are at the point now where it is fair to speculate
about whether Article 2 should survive in the age of the Internet, smart phones, smart
contracts, algorithmic contracts, and digital standard forms. 2 5 In fact, today much
commerce governed by Article 2 consists of sales of goods and intellectual property
licenses formed electronically. These transactions create new issues, including some
that have been resolved-whether Internet sales satisfy the writing requirement of
Section 2-201-and some that are boiling up-what constitutes an enforceable
digital agreement between a business and consumer, and what terms are
substantively fair and enforceable in that context.
Of course, evaluating Article 2 in light of certain technological changes may be
premature or unnecessary. Evaluation would be premature if technology is in flux
and likely to create new issues down the road.26 The "smart contract" revolution is a
good example. 27 Articles are now popping up on this new digital transaction type,
but explanations of what a smart contract is and does are technical and challenging,
at least to tech amatuers (like me). For purposes of this discussion, the following
explanation of a smart contract is helpful, although it only scratches the surface:
Smart contracts enable firms to transact without the need for law or
courts. They can autonomously negotiate with other parties (or
other parties' smart contracts), and then attach directly to the parties'
information systems so that goods or payment promised by the
contract are automatically delivered.2 8
25. See, e.g., Lauren Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017).
26. Hillman, supra note 3, at 1516-17 ("The experience of the drafters ofArticle 4 illustrates this point. They
wisely elected not to draft rules to govern the electronic presentment of checks, an obvious wave of the future,
because banks had not yet adopted the technology and the drafters could not foretell precisely how the system would
operate.").
27. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost ofInflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 263
(2017).
28. Id. at 266-67. Another helpful definition appears in Richard Holden & Anup Malani, Can Blockchain
Solve the Holdup Problem in Contracts? 5 (Univ. Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
846, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract-3093879: "Smart contracts are computer scripts that execute transactions,
including transactions that constitute mutual promises between contracting parties .... When created on blockchain,
the future transactions envisioned in the smart contract are automatically executed and, because of the inalterability
of the blockchain, cannot practically be stopped." Id. at 4-5.
"[A] transaction on a computer network with blockchain infrastructure ... is witnessed by others on the network
(distributed), is made public to everyone on the network (open), and cannot be changed without a tremendous amount
of computer power or cost (unalterable)." Id. at 4.
Sklaroff offers an example in which a lessor of cars can activate or terminate operation of the cars remotely. Lessor
and lessee "have pre-specified a bargaining logic based on their desired terms .... [Lessor] runs a blockchain
program that monitors his accounts and inventory, analyzes [lessee's] terms, and then autonomously negotiates terms
acceptable to both." Sklaroff, supra note 27, at 13-14. Lessee also runs a blockchain program that monitors the
lessee's funds. "Both applications are authorized to bargain and enter into a smart contract for their respective
owners." Id. at 14. If the lessee fails to make a payment, the smart contract can terminate operation of the cars. Id.
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A debate roils about whether "smart contracts will revolutionize the way firms
transact [business] and [whether they will] fundamentally transform our social and
legal institutions." 29 Advocates believe that smart contracts will create efficiencies
such as increasing the speed and accuracy of exchanges, reducing drafting costs, and
creating less expensive enforcement techniques.o Others disagree and worry that
smart contracts eliminate the parties' flexibility to draft broadly and to enforce terms
selectively, both necessary to deal with uncertainty in "volatile or uncertain
environments." 3 1 Legislation should await some resolution of whether these
predictions one-way or the other have any merit. In short, as smart contracts
demonstrate, revision is premature if lawmakers would have difficulty predicting
technology's effect on commercial parties' methods of doing business.
Lawmakers also should not overreact to changes in technology if, on balance,
existing law can handle particular new issues.32 As an example, fancy new gadgets,
filled with software, are flooding markets and, inevitably, some will not live up to
their marketing boasts. Warranty law will come into play. Article 2's warranty
scheme seems up to the task, with at least one caveat. 3 3 Section 2-316(l)'s direction
to construe express Warranties and disclaimers, consistently if possible,. may not
adequately reconcile vendors' strong propensity to make assertions about their
products that constitute express warranties, only to disclaim them in their digital
standard forms. 34 For another more general example, technology facilitates planning
and drafting contracts, sending notices, assembling documents, etc., but it is not clear
that such modem advances render Article 2's general approach to interpretation and
gap filling obsolete.35
Some legal adaptation to technology has already occurred. Article 1, for
example, defines "signed" in part for the purposes of the Section 2-201 Statute of
Frauds, as including "using any symbol executed or adopted with present intention
to adopt or accept a writing."36 But the Code defines a "writing" as including
"printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."37 Courts
have found that "tangible" includes electronic contracts because they can be saved
29. Sklaroff, supra note 27, at 276.
30. See, e.g., Reggie O'Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING
INST. 177, 183 (2017).
31. Holden and Finkelstein, supra note 28; See also Holden & Malani, supra note 27, at 21 ("[S]mart
contracts require the parties and/or a hired programmer to script [the] contract[].").
32. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 430 (2002).
33. See, e.g., Davidson v. Apple, Inc., 2017 WL 3149305 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
34. See Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE
J. OF LAW & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2009) (fifty-three of fifty-four software titles sampled made express warranties that were
then disclaimed).
35. "For reasons that are partly historical and partly driven by the modem market for gasoline, sellers of oil
and of oil derivatives such as gasoline have traditionally agreed to sell at a 'posted price.' In the earliest days of oil
production, this was apparently a price on a note nailed to a post in an oil field. More recently, it is the price, disclosed
on a Web site, which a gasoline wholesaler offers to retail gas stations. Of course, this is a price to be fixed by the
seller under 2-305(2) and so must be fixed in 'good faith."' I UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4:15. See also
George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 177 (2013).
36. U.C.C. § 1-20 1(b)(37) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at § 1-201(b)(43).
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on a hard drive and printed.3 8 The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) also
authorizes the use of electronic signatures and records.39
But many Article 2 issues remain. For example, certainly the appearance of
software licenses and hard goods loaded with software exacerbates the sale-of-goods
versus services quagmire that determines whether Article 2 even applies.4 0 Because
the Internet facilitates rapid communication and collaboration, many formation and
modification processes likely also will change in the future.4 1 In fact, old methods of
forming business contracts that implicate the "battle of the forms," modification
agreements, and other offer and acceptance practices may eventually become only
of historical interest.4 2 Changes in technology may mean the obsolescence of
Sections 2-207 and 2-209.43 In fact, despite the number of cases that still arise, we
may have reached a tipping point with respect to Section 2-207, with commercial
parties increasingly doing business online subject to posted terms on their website:
Commercial parties have increasingly stopped exchanging forms as
their mode of contracting or as their method for confirming an
agreement; they choose instead to place and receive orders through
web applications. In this new environment, the battle of the forms
may be irrelevant to commercial transactions. 44
On the other hand, "battle of the forms" type problems may continue to raise serious
issues in the context of automated "smart" contracting, if "no means are provided for
reconciling conflicting contractual terms." 5
Perhaps the most important current issue influenced by modem technology that
needs more study is whether Article 2 should be revised to regulate business to
consumer standard-form Internet contracts. It is not surprising that many analysts
believe the Internet has only exacerbated the problem of business opportunism by,
38. See, e.g., Bazak Intern. Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Group, 378 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
39. See I UCC TREATISE, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting UETA to the effect that "in the context of Articles 2
and 2A, the UETA provides the vehicle for assuring that [electronic] transactions may be accomplished and affected
via an electronic medium.").
40. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). See, e.g., In re VTech Data Breach
Litigation, 2017 WL 2880102 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2017).
41. Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic
Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 215, 217-18 (2000); Qizhi Dai &
Robert J. Kauffman, Business Models for Internet-Based B2B Electronic Markets, 6 INT'L J. ELECTRONIC COM. 41,
60 (2002).
42. See Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 200, 203
(2009) ("Nearly instantaneous electronic contracting is increasingly common and has taken on many forms,
including even the use of electronic agents to reduce transaction costs by altogether eliminating human
involvement.").
43. See Francis J. Mootz, After the Battle ofthe Forms: Commercial Contracting in the Electronic Age, 4
I/S: J.L. & Pol'y for Info 271, 274, 279 (2008). See also id. at 279; Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L.
REv. 459, 483 (2006).
44. Mootz, supra note 43, at 273.
45. Jose Angelo Estrella Faria, e-Commerce and International Legal Harmonization: Time to Go Beyond
Functional Equivalence, 16 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L. J. 529, 555 (2004). Thus, "battle of the forms" issues can arise
in digital transactions, absent a smart-contract approach that allows for "autonomous[} negotiat[ion]." Sklaroff,
supra note 27, at 276.
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among other things, facilitating merchants' presentation of obtuse and lengthy
standard forms and merchants' creation of questionable methods of acceptance in an
environment in which few consumers read their voluminous, overly technical
forms.46 Whether large legislative changes are in order is debatable, however. After
all, Internet standard-form contracting generally affords consumers more time to
consider their transaction and to search for better deals. Consumers are also free from
the coerciveness of sales agents or the impatience of other customers waiting in line.
In addition, it is easy in the digital world to spread the word about unsavory business
practices. Negative publicity should incentivize businesses to draft reasonable terms.
Such advantages may counterbalance those of businesses in the digital world.47
If arguments for revision prevail, Article 2's current approach to the problem of
merchant opportunism is not a helpful starting point. Sections 2-204 and 2-206 on
formation relax some common law requirements such as definiteness and manners
of acceptance, but understandably have nothing pertinent to say about the formation
and content problems of Internet standard-form contracts. 4 8 Courts require a
"manifestation of assent" by consumers to terms after they have received reasonable
"inquiry notice." 49 Thus, courts enforce so-called clickwrap terms that require
clicking "I agree" adjacent to the screen presentation of the standard form, which
process resembles signing a paper contract." Courts balk, however, at browsewrap
terms that require arduous searching even to unearth them." The danger is that
consumers with little patience and with good reason not to read the forms will click
"I agree" or the like to substantively nasty terms regardless of the manner of their
presentation.52
46. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 432-33; but see Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just
One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM L. REV. 984, 1011 (2008) ("[T]he contracts
found on Internet retailers' websites contain the standard, pro-seller boilerplate provisions-arbitration, disclaimers
of consequential damages, and the like-much less frequently than would be expected. No such clauses appear in
the contracts for more than half of the retailers that we studied.").
47. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 32, at 462-464; but see Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin,
Pseudo-Contract & Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract-3124018) (people may be starting to buy into the superficially simple picture of contract
formation). In 2014 General Mills created a furor by including a mandatory arbitration provision when customers
downloaded coupons. General Mills quickly eliminated the term. Stephanie Strom, When 'Liking' a Brand Online
Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when-liking-a-
brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html.
48. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) ("Even though one or more terms are
left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."; U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 2017) ("An offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances.").
49. Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30-31 (2d Cir. 2002). See Brian Bix, Consent and
Contracts, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 264-65 (Andreas Midler & Peter
Schaber eds., forthcoming 2018) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031183).
50. See, e.g., Tres Jeanee, Inc. v. Brolin Retail Sys. Midwest, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-139-H, 2007 WL 3118482
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2007).
51. See, e.g., Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17.
52. See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 44-52 (2013). Nancy Kim
labels as "crook" terms those that diminish rights unrelated to the present contract and "shield" terms as those that
eliminate rights in the present contract, such as disclaimers and remedy limitations. In addition, "sword" terms
require, for example, mandatory arbitration. See Danielle Kie Hart, Form & Substance in Nancy Kim 's Wrap
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Suggestions for legal intervention that go beyond the judicial clickwrap-
browsewrap distinction abound, but each presents problems. One solution would
require consumers to click "I agree" next to each contestable term, but will
consumers become cautious and slow down even in this environment or just rapidly
click through each term? For that matter, it is not in the interest of either businesses
or consumers to bog down contract formation by such procedures. Another solution
is to create a governmental agency to pre-approve terms. Such an approach would
be costly and time consuming and would introduce all of the pitfalls of agencies,
such as lack of resources to promulgate effective strategies and capture by the
industry.54
A third suggestion is to increase the punch of substantive unconscionability and
other policing doctrines. One writer even advocates dispensing with the
requirement that businesses set forth boilerplate terms and satisfy inquiry notice on
the theory that assent to standard forms is a useless fiction. Instead, courts should
strike unfair terms that businesses reveal upon a dispute. Such approaches require
confidence that courts can sort out enforceable and unenforceable terms under the
rubric of unconscionability or the like in a manner that guides contract drafters and
reduces litigation. I am doubtful. For example, suppose the law dispensed with
inquiry notice. A vendor wishes to license its software "as is." The software doesn't
work and the licensee complains. The vendor responds: "Sorry, licensee, one of our
terms that we didn't have to reveal is that you were licensing the software 'as is.'
Is the term unconscionable? "As is" clauses have a long history of enforcement, but
faced with a product that does not work and the lack of notice, I doubt that a court
would enforce the term. If not, this means that vendors can never enforce software
"as is" terms if they followed law that does not require inquiry notice.
Still another proposed solution to the problem of Internet boilerplate is to
encourage private sector rating services. This has some appeal, but requires easy
access to standard forms. The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts (ALI Principles) calls for disclosure of forms on websites before
a consumer enters a transaction and would facilitate the rating services in this
regard. Even without the aid of formal rating services, the ALI Principles take the
position that advanced disclosure supports Internet watchdog groups that publicize
potentially unfair terms, such as authorizing unilateral modification, unfair
arbitration, or negative options.58
Disclosure is itself a contentious subject, however. Naysayers assert that
disclosure is useless and costly (in this context and even in other disclosure
Contracts, 44 Sw. L. REV. 251,252 (2014) (quoting Kim at n.4). Professor Hart argues that the Internet is a "coercive
contracting environment" for consumers.
53. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O'Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L.
REv. 95, 108-09 (2011).
54. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Counsel Draft No. 3, at 4-5, 2017).
56. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences ofDisclosing Standard Terms, 103 Cornell L. Rev.
117, 168 ("Termlessness is not quite as disruptive a notion as it looks at first glance.").
57. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2009).
58. Id. at § 2.02 cmt. h.
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regimes).59 These skeptics fail to consider how digital communication increases the
potential for Internet users to spread the word about unfair terms. Further, disclosure
is relatively costless to consumers precisely because they do not read the terms. It is
also inexpensive for vendors who can display their standard form on their homepage.
Even if disclosure does not establish true assent to boilerplate, disclosure skeptics
also fail to appreciate its importance for reasons of autonomy, corrective justice, and
morality, issues I have treated elsewhere. 60 Finally, one disclosure skeptic argues that
disclosure has the perverse effect of "inhibit[ing] substantive objections to ... terms"
61because of consumers' belief that they have a moral duty to honor their contracts.
The evidence is thin, and one wonders if consumers really have any position on terms
they have not read or would not understand even if revealed at the time of a dispute.
The problem of consumer assent to Internet standard-form transactions is far
from resolved. Current Article 2 is no help. In Part III, however, I set forth an
example of one approach of the UCC that contributes to the UCC's adaptability to
the new millennia.
HI. DOES ARTICLE 2 IMPEDE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES?
Part III's question obviously relates to the previous technology discussion. To
the extent that Article 2 does not provide answers to issues created by new
commercial practices supported by technology, this lack of legal certainty creates
costs. In this section, however, I want to focus on one successful approach of Articles
1 and 2. Potential reformers should hold on to Article l's treatment of trade custom,
course of dealing, and course of performance to interpret Article 2 contracts in order
to capture what Llewellyn called the "situation sense" of the transaction.6 2
59. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 13 (2014) ("[M]andated disclosure persistently fails to achieve its purposes, cannot be
fixed, and too often causes harm. Lawmakers should stop using it. . .
60. See Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 53 at 106-07.
61. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 56, at 172.
62. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121 (1960); U.C.C. § 1-
303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, and Usage of Trade):
(a) A "course of performance" is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction that exists if:
(1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated
occasions for performance by a party; and
(2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces to it without objection.
(b) A "course of dealing" is a sequence of conduct concernmg previous transactions between
the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
(c) A "usage of trade" is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such usage must be
proved as facts . ...
Id. at (a)-(c).
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Scholars debate the merits of this approach with fervor." For example, skeptics
(sometimes called textualists) believe that admitting extrinsic evidence impedes
commercial practices because judges and juries are ill equipped to apply these
sources and make mistakes when they do so. 6 4 Supporters of the Code approach,
however (sometimes called contextualists), believe that the meaning of contract
language cannot be realized without evidence of context.6 ' Further, supporters have
more faith in judges and juries to get it right. In addition, as I have written in support
of Article 2's approach, "parties often expect cooperation and flexibility from their
contracting partner, not rigid adherence to the technical meaning of the written terms.
Only the full picture can reveal the parties' reasonable expectations.",67
In short, I am persuaded by what Justice Traynor said on this subject in another
context years ago (despite Judge Kozinski's admonition that Traynor's approach
"chips away at the foundation of our legal system"):
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to
discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the
manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have
absolute and constant referents .... The meaning of particular words
or group of words varies with the ... verbal context and surrounding
circumstances .... 69
Viewed in isolation, Traynor's argument for the importance of context seemed
to pave the way for contracting parties to prove that "black" means "white" or that
500 means 300 in the context of their transaction. But Traynor cabined his argument
by noting that evidence must be "reasonabl[y] susceptible" to a particular meaning
and "credible" to shed meaning on contract language.70 By relying on practices in a
trade or sequences of conduct in the present or a previous contract, trade custom,
course of dealing, and course of performance certainly meet Traynor's test. Each
63. An excellent summary of the arguments and of additional related issues appears in Joshua M. Silverstein,
Using the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and Coding Device for Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Demonstrating the Method via a Study of Contract Interpretation, 34 J.L. & COM. 203, 253-84 (2016).
64. Id. at 265; see also Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 Nw. U.L. Rev. 63 (2015) (discussing the
absence of statistical evidence).
65. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 265.
66. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 267; see also Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic
Perspective on the Interpretation of Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 562-63 (2017) ("There is no reason to assume
that [courts] are unable to identify the intentions of the parties even if these intentions are not embedded in the text
of the contract .... []f discovering the consent of the parties outside of the agreement is a difficult task, it does not
become easier when the courts are forced to work without access to all the relevant information.").
67. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (4th ed. forthcoming 2019); Lifshitz & Finkelstein,
supra note 66, at 554 ("Relational contract theory preferred ... interpretive techniques that allow the interpreter to
consider sources external to the contractual text in order to interpret the contract according to the relationship
between the parties.").
68. Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
69. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
70. Id.
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source of evidence supports a reasonable interpretation of contract terms, not claims
of subjective intent.
Those opposed to Article 2's dependence on the use of extrinsic evidence also
contend that the law should incentivize the drafting of relatively complete contracts,
not allow drafters to rely on context to fill in the meaning of terms. 7 2 These analysts
contend that complete contracts reduce lawsuits because issues over meaning will be
limited." Article 2's supporters argue, however, that the Article's reliance on context
reduces the costs of planning, bargaining, and drafting contracts precisely because
parties do not have to cover all the bases in the contract, many of which are
unanticipated or unforeseen.7 4 One commentator with a persuasive argument on this
aspect of the debate has pointed out that the costs of planning "are incurred with
certainty and in the present while enforcement costs are incurred rarely and well into
the future."
Case law suggests that the division between textual and contextual orientations
is often not so stark. However, the UCC's invitation to courts to supplement the
written contract with objective outside evidence in the interpretation process is
crucial if the law's goal is to enforce a reasonable interpretation of the contract. 77
This strategy also helps position Article 2 to support new methods of doing business
in the age of the Internet that may involve more communication and informality. I
concede, of course, that the use of extrinsic evidence likely will have little role in
contracts that rely on algorithms and other non-human interactions.
71. See, e.g., Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Of course,
trade custom, course of dealing, and course of performance sources of evidence can prove a meaning that contradicts
the dictionary definition of the language. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644 n.6:
Extrinsic evidence of trade usage or custom has been admitted to show that the term "United
Kingdom" in a motion picture distribution contract included Ireland ([Ermolieff v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, 122 P.2d 3, 5-8 (Cal.1942)]); that the word "ton" in a lease meant a long ton
or 2,240 pounds and not the statutory ton of 2,000 pounds ([Higgins v. California Petroleum,
etc., Co., 52 P. 180 (Cal. 1898)1); that the word "stubble" in a lease included not only stumps
left in the ground but everything "left on the ground after the harvest time" ([Callahan v.
Stanley, 57 Cal. 476, 477-79 (1881)]); that the term "north" in a contract dividing mining
claims indicated a boundary line running along the "magnetic and not the true meridian"
([Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower & Co., 11 Cal. 194, 197-99 (1858)]) and that a form contract for
purchase and sale was actually an agency contract ([Body-Steffner Co. v. Flotill Prods. Inc.,
147 P. 2d 84, 85-89 (1944)]).
But see Lisa Bernstein, The Myth of Trade Usages: A Talk for Kcon, BARRY L. REv. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing
trade usages do not exist and cannot be proven accurately if they did exist); Robert Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We
Can Do, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 677, 686-688 (2001) ("incorporation of context ... simply has not occurred in a
meaningful way").
72. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 277.
73. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 272.
74. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 268-69.
75. Silverstein, supra note 63, at 281; see also Lifshitz & Finkelstein, supra note 66, at 557-558.
76. Lifshitz & Finkelstein, supra note 66, at 520-521 ("The textualist approach focuses primarily on the
plain meaning of the language contained within the four corners of the contract. In contrast, the contextualist.
approach allows courts to consider a wider array of information outside the text of the agreement in order to comply
with the parties' intended purpose ... .However, a closer look at legal opinions from courts throughout the United
States reveals a great deal of inconsistency regarding how to approach contract interpretation, even within states that
putatively fit into either the textualist or contextualist camp.").
77. See supra note 67, and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This paper certainly does not resolve the question of Article 2's prospects for the
future, nor is it a complete treatment of the issues currently at play. But the analysis
does suggest that some sections have worked better than others and some are better
suited for the future than others. A logical way forward would be to look carefully
at the entire Article and to revise only problematic sections based on the criteria
applied here and any additional objective criteria helpful in identifying problems.7 9
One mistake of the drafters of the unsuccessful revised Article 2 was that they
failed to spare any section from revision regardless of need.80 There are costs to such
an approach, including introducing new ambiguities, replacing rules already clarified
by case law, and reeducating business and consumer communities.81 Instead of a
blunderbuss approach, there should have been a presumption in favor of the existing
law, with the need for revisions guided by criteria in part identified here.
79. Hillman, supra note 3.
80. A comparison of the January 24, 1997 revised draft and the 1995 Official Text of Article 2 prepared
March 19, 1997 by General Electric was 72 pages long (on file with author). See also supra note 3.
81. Hillman, supra note 3, at 1509-10.
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